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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RECAPTURING THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT BEHIND THE
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Scenario 1: Imagine coming home after a long day of work and hearing a
phone call as you walk in. The caller ID lists an unknown number or an area
code you do not recognize. You pick up the phone; it is the same debt
collector who has called you the last three weeks, requesting payment of
medical bills you incurred last year. Later that night, you search the internet
for “Debt Help” and come across an advertisement claiming that “Collection
companies can’t legally collect if they can’t prove it.” Although you know that
you do in fact legally owe the debt, you cannot help but wonder whether the
advertisement you read really could put an end to the stress. You know what
you are doing is not right, but you are dealing with a debt collector who you’ve
never met and who is giving you no choice; so what’s the big deal?
Scenario 2: Twenty-five years ago, you were hospitalized after a bad car
accident. Unfortunately, after your release, you were unable to pay for the full
cost of your visit. However, the hospital was a charitable organization and
agreed to forgive the remaining debt. You have since forgotten about the debt
and have planned your budget accordingly. Recently, you received a letter
from a debt collector demanding the remainder of the balance. The letter
informs you that you have the right to contest the debt, but the letter uses
extremely harsh words, threatening legal action within ten days if you do not
pay. Although you consider challenging the debt, you are afraid of the
threatened legal action and decide to pay. You only find out later that the debt
you just paid was never legally owed.
As Americans face a recession of unknown proportions,1 largely due to
consumers’ involvement with risky mortgages and high credit-card bills,2 the

1. Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Recession To Be Longer than Usual: UMich, REUTERS, Feb. 8,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0826726720080208. Not only do many fear that this
is the worst recession our country has faced in a quarter of a century, some predict that conditions
will get worse before they get better. Maura Reynolds & Peter Nicholas, U.S. Says Recession Is
Worst in 26 Years, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at A1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/200901-31/news/17199199_1_white-house-robert-gibbs-wall-street.
2. Reynolds & Nicholas, supra note 1, at A1.
549
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risk of large numbers of consumers defaulting on loans is a very real problem.3
Struggling for any kind of cash flow,4 businesses are forced to seek out
collection agencies, which either collect money for the business at a percentage
or who buy the debt for pennies on the dollar.5 These collectors then become
the legal holder of this debt.6 Their actions are governed by the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), a consumer protection statute passed by
Congress in 1978 as a means to curb abusive collection activities.7
As the above examples illustrate, the consumer-credit industry faces a
constant struggle between keeping its creditors able to extend lines of credit
while protecting consumers from abusive and harassing demands for payment.
The FDCPA, devised for the purpose of striking that balance,8 comes up short
in several ways. As a result, an onslaught of litigation has ensued, pitting the
unwitting consumer against the often fair and honest collector. In the end, the
losers are creditors, consumers, and the taxpayers who support our courts,
suffering at the expense of consumer-advocacy attorneys.
As harmful as frivolous litigation can be to the collections industry, there
are those collection agencies that do break the law in their collection efforts,
often targeting minorities, the elderly9 and poor consumers.10 While the
FDCPA does provide enforcement mechanisms against these agencies, the law
stops short of solving the problem. By allowing creditors to assign their
delinquent accounts to collectors whom they know will likely use unethical
means to collect debt, the law provides little incentive for creditors to choose
collectors which practice their trade honestly. Assigning a debt to an unethical
collector is a win-win situation for the creditor, as they might collect more,
face no penalties and will not have their company’s name associated with
abhorrent collection practices.
Part I of this note analyzes how large numbers of unwary consumers and
honest debt collectors attempt to tread carefully in the modern debt collection3. Christine Cadena, Fair Debt Collection: Facts Often Overlooked, ASSOCIATED
CONTENT, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/118259/fair_debt_collection_
facts_often_overlooked.html (further stating that the average U.S. household is $7,200 in debt).
4. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, CHOOSING THE RIGHT DEBT BUYER 7 (2008),
available at http://www.hfma.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=2317.
5. Abigail Curtis, For Whom the Bell Tolls; Debt Collection Business Flourishes in
Recessionary Economy, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 20, 2008, at C1.
6. Id.
7. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006); S. REP. NO. 95382 at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1966.
8. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 3–4.
9. See generally Matthew W. Ludwig, Abuse, Harassment, and Deception: How the
FDCPA Is Failing America’s Elderly Debtors, 16 ELDER L.J. 135 (2008).
10. See generally Robert B. Chapman, “Honest and Unfortunate” or Dishonest and
Greedy? Discriminating Against the Discriminated-Against in Bankruptcy, Presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the the Law and Society Association (May 27, 2004).
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industry. Part II introduces the history and relevant portions of the FDCPA
and Congress’ original intent. Part III discusses the important role the
collections industry plays in our nation’s economy, particularly in maintaining
a lending environment. Part IV reveals that empirical evidence suggests
consumers, when given the fair opportunity, fully intend to pay debts they
incur. Part V discusses the problem of consumers who, disgruntled and
uncertain about what debt they actually owe, too often give in to the temptation
to seek a consumer-advocacy attorney to eliminate debt they actually owe.
These attorneys exploit the vagueness of the FDCPA as well as portions which
have not kept current with rapidly changing communications technology.
Finally, Part VI argues that, by bringing the debtor into the process more
effectively and by requiring collection agencies to offer settlements, more
debtors will take responsibility for their debts and be less likely to seek
frivolous lawsuits. In addition, it recommends the addition of a federal cause of
action against original creditors who outsource their collections to negligent
contractors as a means to preemptively stop abusive collection efforts and
subsequent litigation. Lastly, it makes suggestions for amendments to the
FDCPA in order to eliminate some of the frequently litigated technical issues
raised by consumer advocacy attorneys.
II. BACKGROUND
Advocated by consumer groups, labor unions and organizations which
represent debt collectors,11 the FDCPA was passed in 1977 as an amendment
to the Consumer Credit Protection Act.12 The legislation’s stated goal was to
“protect consumers from a host of unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt
collection practices without imposing unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt
collectors.”13 The need for this legislation was based on a study of third-party
debt collection by the Banking and Consumer Affairs Subcommittee of
Congress, which examined the growing business of third-party debt collection
in the United States.14 Such debt collection, which is vital to the health of the
American economy, will be discussed below.15 Essentially, Congress became
concerned with the lack of regulation concerning this growing breed of debt

11. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2.
12. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o (2006)). The Consumer Credit Protection Act was the first
general federal consumer protection bill passed by Congress. Although its original purpose was
to protect debtors by mandating full disclosure of the terms of loans, it failed to address the debtcollection end of the process. Consumer Credit Protection Act, The Free Dictionary by Farlex,
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Consumer+Credit+Protection+Act.
13. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 1–2.
14. Id. at 2.
15. See infra Part III.
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collectors.16 State laws were largely seen as ineffective, as they often had
difficulty regulating and punishing out-of-state, third-party debt collectors.17
Also, as many as 13 states did not have debt collection laws at all, leaving 40%
of the nation’s population without protection.18 The Consumer Credit
Protection Act, the Act which the FDCPA amended,19 was seen as too weak
and did not specifically address third-party debt collection.20 Many consumeradvocacy groups reported that collectors were sometimes abusive in their
collection efforts, made false threats, used inappropriate language in telephone
calls, threatened violence and collected debt that was no longer legally
owed.21 In addition, debt collecting lobbies argued that unethical debt
collectors retained a competitive advantage over honest ones. 22
A.

Who the Act Applies To

The FDCPA only regulates the behavior of debt collectors, which has been
determined to mean all third-party debt collectors.23 The definition of “debt
collector,” as stated in the statute, is “any person 1) who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business, the
principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, or 2) who regularly
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another.”24 Original creditors are explicitly
excluded from this definition, except when a creditor 1) uses a pseudonym
which suggests that a third-party collector is involved in the collection process
or 2) obtains the debt after default for the purpose of collection.25 In addition,
the statute only applies to debt in connection with purchases for personal,
family, or household purposes; it does not cover debts incurred in one’s
business.26

16. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r (2006); S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 1; Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006).
20. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 3.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). Whether a creditor has used a name other than its own depends
on whether the name used is sufficiently identified with the name used by the creditor in
conducting the underlying transaction. Randolph Bragg, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
15 U.S.C. 1692 ET SEQ., 1591 12TH ANN. CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES LITIG. INST. 437, 455
(2007).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
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Behavior Which Constitutes Violations of the Act

Many violations under the FDCPA deal with communication from the
collector to the debtor. The statute defines a “communication” as “the
conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person
through any medium.”27 Communications to the debtor may not be false,
deceptive, or misleading.28 The standard used to determine whether a
collector’s methods fall within this definition is the “least sophisticated
consumer” standard.29
In a collection agency’s attempt to make initial contact with the debtor, it
must disclose clearly to the debtor that the communication is for the purpose of
collecting a debt, and that any information obtained will be used for that
purpose.30 This is been referred to as the “Mini Miranda” warning and will be
discussed in depth later in this comment.31
Within five days of the initial communication to a debtor, a collector is
required to provide a debtor with a “validation notice,” unless it has already
been included in the first communication.32 The law requires this notice to
inform the debtor of the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor to whom
the debt was originally owed, and a statement saying that the consumer has 30
days from receipt of the notice to dispute any or all of the debt.33 The dispute
of any debt must be sent to the collector in writing, upon which collection
efforts must cease.34 The debt collector must then obtain verification of the
debt and send it to the consumer.35 It is still unclear what words may or may
not accompany the validation notice.36
In its communications with a debtor, a collector may not use any “unfair or
unconscionable means in order to collect a debt.”37 This prohibits the
collection of any amounts that have been illegally included in the debt total,
including but not limited to collection charges, interest, services charges, late

27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
29. Bragg, supra note 25, at 457. “This standard serves the dual purpose of protecting all
consumers, including the inexperienced, the untrained and credulous, from deceptive debt
collection practices and protecting debt collectors against liability for bizarre idiosyncratic
consumer interpretations of collection materials.” Essentially, the court will judge whether the
collector has acted deceptively based upon what would deceive the least-sophisticated consumer.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).
31. See infra Parts V.A–C.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)–(5).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
36. Elwin Griffith, Identifying Some Trouble Spots in the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act: A Framework for Improvement, 83 NEB. L. REV 762, 784 (2005).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
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fees, or bad-check handling charges.38 These fees may be legally added to the
debt if they were provisions of the service contract signed by the debtor and do
not conflict with state law.39
Under the FDCPA, “any conduct, the natural consequence of which is to
harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with a debt,” is subject to
civil damages.40 This conduct includes unnecessary calls to third parties,
multiple calls to consumers with the purpose of harassment, and abusive
tactics, specifically the use of obscene, profane, or abusive language.41 In
addition, collectors may not communicate with a consumer at any time or place
which is unusual or known to be inconvenient to the consumer, and they may
not communicate with a debtor at his place of employment.42 In addition,
violation of the FDCPA is a strict liability offense; a claimant need not allege
that a defendant purposely or negligently attempted to harass the consumer,
and need only prove one violation to trigger penalties.43
C. Third Parties
In the interest of protecting the consumer’s privacy, a debt collector may
not communicate the details of a debt to any other person but the consumer.44
A debt collector may, however, do so to find out the location of the alleged
debtor.45 Past cases have awarded damages to consumers when a collector
accidentally called the wrong number with information about a debt, left a
message for a debtor and somebody else overheard and when a collector
inadvertently contacted a spouse.46 In the same interests of privacy, the
FDCPA has banned the use of postcards to communicate the presence of a
debt.47

38. STAFF COMMENTARY ON THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, § 808(1), http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/commentary.htm#808
[hereinafter FTC STAFF COMMENTARY].
39. Id.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
41. FTC STAFF COMMENTARY, supra note 38, § 806; 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1), (3). The Staff Commentary of the FTC has determined that the
hours in which a collector may contact a debtor are between the hours of 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. local
time. FTC STAFF COMMENTARY, supra note 38, §805(a).
43. See Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1322 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that although it is
in the court’s discretion whether or not to award damages, the FDCPA is a strict-liability statute).
See also Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b.
46. Federal Trade Commission v. Check Enforcement, No. Civ.A. 03-2115, 2005 WL
1677480, at *8 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005) (holding that voicemail messages overheard by family that
were intended for the debtor was a violation of the debtor’s privacy and thus a violation of the
FDCPA).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(4).
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D. Damages
A debt collector who has violated any provision of the FDCPA is liable for
actual damages.48 These damages can include emotional distress, loss of
income for missed work and other remedies.49 In addition to actual damages,
the consumer may be awarded “such additional damages as the court may
allow, not exceeding $1000.”50 The statute lays out how a court should award
such damages, as it must consider the “frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such non-compliance, and the
extent to which the non-compliance was intentional.”51 However, it remains
unclear what “not exceeding “$1000” exactly means.52 Although the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits have held that statutory award damages may not be made per
violation but per case brought against the collector,53 other Circuits disagree,
and Congress has not responded by codifying one of these approaches.54
E.

Attorneys’ fees

If a consumer wins his or her case on the merits, he or she is entitled to an
award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.55 However, if the court
determines that the consumer has brought a claim in bad faith, the collector
may be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees.56
F.

Underlying Premises of the Act

While the Banking and Consumer Affairs Subcommittee concluded that
there was need for substantial federal legislation to regulate third-party debt
collectors, it put forth two very important premises. Firstly, although the
presence of unscrupulous debt collectors was a widespread problem that
affected a large segment of the population, such bad actors were the exception
to the rule.57 Instead, most debt collectors were honest business men and

48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1).
49. Household Credit Services v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 90 (Tex. App. 1998).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2). FTC STAFF COMMENTARY, supra note 38. These additional
damages are equivalent to statutory damages.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1).
52. Bragg, supra note 25, at 483.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).
56. See generally Csugi v. Monterey Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 3:95CV2140, 2001 WL 1841444,
at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2001) as cited in Bragg, supra note 25, at 487 n.310. All attorneys’ fees
are calculated using the lodestar method, which multiplies the number of hours reasonably
expended by a reasonable hourly rate. See Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, 2001 Update on
the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 56 BUS. LAW. 1231, 1244 (2001) (citing Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).
57. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2 (1977).
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women, providing an important service in several sectors of the economy for
small and large businesses alike.58 Also, the concept of the ubiquity of the
“deadbeat debtor,” which is described as a consumer who purchases goods on
credit with no intention of ever paying for them, was relatively misguided.59
III. THE DEBT COLLECTION INDUSTRY
As consumer-advocacy attorneys dig their feet in, ostensibly fighting for
the interests of the consumer, they are winning more and more judgments
against collection agencies.60 While complaints to the Federal Trade
Commission are on the rise,61 debt collectors, honest and dishonest alike, face
an onslaught of litigation.62 At the time the FDCPA was passed, Senators
Harrison Schmitt (R-New Mexico), Jake Garn (R-Utah) and John Tower (RTexas) expressed concern regarding the availability of these civil remedies
against debt collectors.63 Specifically, they feared that increased regulation
would have a drastic effect on small businesses, which would likely have a
particularly hard time assigning delinquent debt.64
In addition, they
forewarned that the availability of credit to consumers would be drastically
affected, especially during times of widespread credit crises.65 In the end, they
claimed, the consumer would be the loser, bearing the cost of these civil
remedies through higher interest rates and an increased cost of goods.66
Unfortunately, the senators’ predictions, in some ways, have come to
fruition. To understand the effect of these frivolous claims, one must
understand how collection agencies work and how important these businesses
are to the U.S. economy.
A.

The Importance of the Debt Collection Industry

When a business extends a line of credit to a consumer, they do so with the
belief that the consumer will pay back all payments due, including interest. As

58. Id.
59. Id. at 3.
60. See A.D. Sanderson, Pretrial Litigation in Consumer Advocacy, 79 OKLA. BAR ASS’N
579, 579 (2008), available at http://www.okbar.org/obj/accesstojustice/2008/030808.htm.
61. See Jennifer Pirone & Lee Ferran, Beware of Dirty Debt Collection Practices: Getting
the Money at All Costs Causes Some Debt Collectors to Break the Law, ABC NEWS ONLINE
(Nov. 1, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=6159203 (further stating that consumers
feel as though collection agencies treat all debtors like deadbeats, which causes collectors to use
intimidation and harassment to collect debt).
62. Id.
63. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 9.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Rachel Witkowski, SBA Loans Slammed by Credit Crunch, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., Jan.
21, 2009, 2009 WLNR 1169682.
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soon as the consumer stops making payments, rendering the account
delinquent, the business has a choice. Many large businesses have the
resources to collect their bills in-house, and often find this more effective
because consumers feel more obligated to pay the original creditor than thirdparty collectors. Small businesses, however, usually don’t have the resources
or manpower to collect these debts on their own.67 At this juncture, businesses
have a couple of choices. They can write off the debt entirely, deciding that
their efforts to collect will not be cost effective. However, many companies
choose to send these account receivables to collection agencies, whose actions
are covered by the FDCPA.68 A business may choose to either sell its debt off
entirely to a debt buyer, sometimes for pennies on the dollar, or give a
percentage payment to the collector.69 This guaranteed source of income from
aging and uncollectable account receivables gives creditors a fixed cash flow.70
Additionally, some creditors feel more at ease conducting their business,
knowing that if a substantial amount of debt goes unpaid, they will be able to
rely on debt-buyers for quick cash.71
The amount of debt that is collected by third-party debt collectors is
astounding. At the time of the passing of the FDCPA in 1978, $5 billion in
debt was assigned for collection.72 Since that time, the size of the industry has
increased dramatically. The face value of all debt sold to debt buyers in 1993
was $1.3 billion.73 By 1997, that number had grown to $15 billion and sales
reached approximately $25 billion in 2000.74 In 1992, there were five major
debt buying companies in the United States.75 By 1998, that number had
grown to 225,76 and by 2005 there were over 300.77 In 2005, the 6,500
collection agencies operating in the United States, including debt buyers and
percentage collectors, returned almost $40 billion back to businesses.78

67. Felicia A. Williams, Small Business Uncollected Debts: How to Hire a Debt Collection
Agency, SUITE101.COM, Nov. 20, 2007, http://smallhomebusiness.suite101.com/article.cfm/
small_business_uncollected_debts.
68. See id.
69. Christopher Palmeri, Debt Collection Puts On a Suit, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_46/b3959128.htm (reporting
that businesses can sell their debt for as low as 2 cents on the dollar and yield as much as 6 cents).
70. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 4, at 7.
71. Id. at 8.
72. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 2 (1977).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. HERBERT A. ROSENTHAL, DEBT BUYERS ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE DEBT BUYERS
ASS’N (Oct. 9, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/safeguard/dba.htm.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Ludwig, supra note 9, at 141; Robert M. Hunt, Collecting Consumer Debts: The
Challenges of Change, BUS. REV., Second Quarter 2007, at 11, available at
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The health care industry is heavily reliant upon collections. This industry
has been hit hard by bad debt on top of already slim profit margins, sending
health care providers scurrying for quick cash flow.79 While many hospitals
prefer to collect these account receivables themselves, this is becoming more
complicated.80 Many of these accounts first make their way through hospitals’
in-house collection specialists, often with little success.81 In addition, many
hospitals report that they lack the resources to effectively manage the
complexity and sheer number of accounts.82 They find that selling aged
receivables provides immediate cash flow, which is particularly important as
economic times squeeze hospital budgets and resources.83
B.

Exacerbation of the Problem by Recession

As America struggles through a recession, updating the FDCPA has
become even more necessary in order to protect consumers, allow debt
collectors to conduct their business, and keep businesses who depend on debt
collectors viable. As experts predict that America’s unemployment rate will
climb to 9.5% by the end of 2010, its highest rate since 1983,84 Americans will
have less money to pay their debts with.85 Thus, in times of economic
struggles, the amount of bad debt companies must assign to collections
increases.86 The two leaders of this rising debt are credit card debt and medical
debt.87
In addition, the recession has limited the number of financiers who are
willing to extend lines of credit altogether. This has affected loans to small

http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2007/q2/hunt_
collecting-consumer-debt.pdf.
79. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 4, at 2. For example, the cost of a hospital
stay has been outpacing inflation for years; the cost of staying in the hospital increased 13%
annually from 1971–81. Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment
System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 501 (1990).
80. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 4, at 7.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id.
84. Courtney Schlisserman, Unemployment Benefit Rolls in U.S. Soar to Record,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=aqc_bpAZTgqE.
85. Kate Murphy, Pity the Debt Collector, PORTFOLIO.COM, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.port
folio.com/news-markets/top-5/2009/01/27/Trouble-for-Debt-Collectors.
86. In Hard Times, Writing Off Bad Debt Is More than Likely, THE SOUTHLAND TIMES,
November 13, 2008, http://www.stuff.co.nz/southlandtimes/4760152a26783.html.
87. John D. Colombo, Federal and State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and
Healthcare for the Poor, 51 ST. LOUIS U L.J. 433, 449–50 (2007); Hunt, supra note 78, at 7
(noting that as of 2005, 79% of debts collected by collection agencies was for credit-card loans).
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business particularly, as many lenders avoid these sometimes risky
investments.88
IV. WHEN GIVEN A FAIR OPPORTUNITY, DEBTORS WANT TO PAY DEBTS THEY
LEGALLY OWE
In the world of debt collection, debate rages over who exactly is at fault for
the large amount of delinquent account receivables sold by businesses every
day.89 Many in the collections industry believe that most delinquent debtors
are dishonest people who attempt to evade their responsibility to pay back
money that they owe.90 The belief follows that even if they have the money to
pay their debt, they would merely not pay by choice. Under this premise, debt
collecting agencies often train their employees that the only way to collect debt
from these “deadbeat” debtors is through the use of threats, harsh language,
and mentions of impending legal action.91 However, evidence suggests that
when debt collectors engage in conduct that is abusive, it actually makes it less
likely that the debtor will pay.92 Some collection agencies, who determine that
the debtor simply will never pay, make little or no attempt to contact the
debtor, and instead opt for an effective yet expensive legal judgment against
the debtor.93 These judgments allow collectors to garnish the wages of
debtors,94 taking the debtor out of the process almost entirely. Other collectors
use underhanded and manipulative means, such as convincing debtors that
their unpaid debts can result in jail time or by asking for partial payment of the
debt by check.95 When the partial payment is sent, collection agencies can use
the check’s routing number to garnish bank accounts and wages of debtors
without notification to the consumer.96 Lastly, out of mistrust of the debtor,

88. Witkowski, supra note 66.
89. Andrew Leonard, Dollars from Deadbeats, SALON.COM, Sept. 10, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/technology/how_the_world_works/2007/09/10/deadbeats. See generally
Randall Kleinman, Deadbeats: Can You Force Them to Pay?, CBS MONEYWATCH.COM, Aug.
1998, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3615/is_199808/ai_n8809730; DAVID CAPLOVITZ,
CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974) (author asserts that credit
and collection industry created this image as a way to justify unconscionable means to collect
debt).
90. Griffith, supra note 36, at 762–63.
91. See id. at 763.
92. Bragg, supra note 25, at 477.
93. Ludwig, supra note 9, at 141.
94. Cliff Mason, Get Wise to Collection Agents’ Dirty Tricks, THESTREET.COM, Sept. 13,
2007, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10379280/1/get-wise-to-collection-agents-dirty-tricks.html.
95. Id.; Woman Fights Back Against Bad Debt Collectors, CBS NEWS PITTSBURGH, Jan. 22,
2009, http://kdka.com/consumer/credit.card.debt.2.915330.html [hereinafter Woman Fights
Back].
96. Woman Fights Back, supra note 95.
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collection agencies often reject a payment plan previously offered by the
original creditor or will not offer settlements to the debtor.97
Unfortunately, Congress has recently passed legislation with this false
premise in mind. Specifically, updates to bankruptcy code in 2005 were
instituted largely due to hard lobbying from the consumer-credit industry,
which framed the issue that something had to be done about the deadbeats of
society who incur high credit card bills they never intend to pay.98 This lobby
insisted debtors would, instead of paying, wipe their record clean by filing for
bankruptcy; as a result, it is now much more difficult to file for bankruptcy.99
Despite this persistent belief in the ubiquity of the “deadbeat debtor” in the
collections industry, there is zero empirical evidence to support this premise.100
In fact, at the outset of the creation of the FDCPA, Congress concluded that the
vast majority of those who were in default did not incur charges without the
intention of paying.101 Congress thus believed that the passing of the FDCPA
would not limit fair collection, as most debtors do strive to pay debts they
legally owe when they are given the chance.102
Congress’ finding was based on an extensive study of debtor psychology
by sociologist Dr. David Caplovtiz.103 This study examined the spending
habits of several debtors from a cross-section of the community in order to
determine whether the concept of the “deadbeat” was widespread or
mythical.104 After exhaustive research, Caplovitz determined that only 1.3% of
Americans in debt had gotten there by making purchases they believed they
would never pay for.105 Instead, the vast majority of those in default suffered
from some sort of unexpected misfortune out of their control.106 The most
common misfortunes suffered were adverse employment change, illness
resulting in astronomical medical bills, or family problems.107

97. Pirone & Ferran, supra note 61.
98. Leonard, supra note 89 (stating that the bankruptcy reform of 2005 will result in a trend
of higher debt collection numbers, as the law now makes it more difficult for consumers to
eliminate their debt through declaring bankruptcy).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. S. REP. NO. 95-382 at 3 (1977).
102. Id.
103. See generally CAPLOVITZ, supra note 89.
104. See generally id.
105. Id. at 5.58.
106. See generally id.
107. Id. at 5.1, 5.62, 5.70 (finding that the most common family problem resulting in
substantial debt was divorce, usually exacerbated by excessive attorneys’ fees).
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V. ATTORNEYS’ USE OF TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA
When the FDCPA was passed in 1978, the collections industry was small
and relatively unsophisticated.108 Although many collectors practiced their
trade honestly, the industry was plagued by stories of egregious collection
methods. The modes of communication available to collection agencies were
limited, making compliance with the FDCPA’s rules straight-forward.109
While the intentions of the creators of the FDCPA were to protect consumers
and creditors alike, several outdated and unclear provisions of the law have
made collections a very tricky and complicated process.110 These provisions
have allowed consumer-advocacy attorneys the opportunity to advertise to
potential clients a dangerous proposition: “It doesn’t matter whether you owe
the debt; it only matters if they can prove it,” and, “Not only will your debt be
eliminated, but if collection companies make any minor mistakes, they will end
up paying you!”
Essentially, in order to have their clients’ legally owed debts eliminated,
consumer attorneys bring a technical violation against the collector, forcing the
collector to settle.111 They are able to do this because attorneys usually take
FDCPA claims on a contingent basis,112 as it becomes easy to convince a
potential client to pay no fee upfront in exchange for potentially lucrative

108. Shera Erskine, Please Leave a Message After the Tone: How Florida Lawyers Should
Approach the “Mini-Miranda” Warning Requirement of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
32 NOVA L. REV. 245, 246 (2007) (citing Cindy D. Salvo, Technology and the Law (Debt
Collection), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 2005, at 5.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Many consumer-advocacy attorneys are not subtle in their strategy of suing debt
collectors for technical violations. For example, attorney Stephen M. Otto’s law-firm website
brazenly states, “[I]f a violation of the FDCPA is proven, the debt collector is liable. . . . Debt
collectors, and some courts, sometimes refer to these violations as ‘technical’ and dismiss them as
if they are not important. I take issue with this. They are violations. This is strict liability.”
Amy Good-Ashman, They Aren’t “Technical Violations,” It’s Called STRICT LIABILITY,”
Abusivedebtcollection.com (March 24, 2008), http://www.abusivedebtcollection.com/2008/03/
24/they-aren%E2%80%99t-%E2%80%9Ctechnical-violations%E2%80%9D-it%E2%80%99scalled-strict-liability. Another example is the Law Office of Mark Anthony Silverthorn, who in
his attempt to retain consumer clients, boldly proclaims, “Many violations of the FDCPA are
technical in nature. Some courts have ordered debt collectors to pay consumers thousands of
dollars for mere technical violations, such as the failure to include required language on a
collection letter. Debt collectors often find it more cost-effective to settle these claims for a few
thousand dollars, rather than go to trial and spend several times this amount in legal fees.” Mark
Anthony Silverthorn Law Offices, Why a Debt Collector May Have to Pay You Money?,
http://www.collection-calls.com/help-collection-agency.html (last visited August 9, 2010).
112. Lynn A. S. Araki, Comment, Rx for Abusive Debt Collection Practices: Amend the
FDCPA, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 69, 105–06 (1995) (finding that contingent-basis legal fees usually
include little or no money up-front in exchange for an average of 33–40% of any recovery given
to the attorney).
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results.113 In addition, the plaintiff will only be required to pay the defendant’s
attorneys fees if the court determines the claim was brought in bad faith.114 As
a consequence, a “cottage industry” of consumer-advocacy attorneys115 has
been very successful at exploiting the ambiguities in the law in order to coerce
collection agencies to drop their legitimate claims.116 These attorneys often
threaten to sue if they are not paid a quick settlement, knowing the cost of
defending an FDCPA claim can easily reach $10,000 or more.117 Moreover, if
the debtor prevails, the FDCPA requires the payment of attorneys’ fees.118
One attorney in El Paso, New Mexico claims that suing for admittedly minor
violations has been big business, as his average settling price is about $7,500
plus a cessation of collection efforts.119 Essentially, for a collection agency, it
is more cost effective to pay a settlement and forgive a debt than take a chance
and fight a case in court, as several collectors have lost in the past due to minor
violations. As a result of these ambiguities, collection agencies are forced to
charge businesses more in order to offset the risk of an FDCPA lawsuit.120
Clearly, in order for the collections industry to survive, the law must be
updated in order to allow honest collectors to perform their job effectively.
A.

The FDCPA Has Not Kept Current with Changing Communications
Technology

Several members of commercial advocacy groups bemoan the failure of
Congress to update the FDCPA to keep current with technological changes in

113. Id. at 106.
114. One dissenting judge in this case angrily conjectured how the settlement negotiations
likely proceeded between the plaintiff suing the collector under the FDCPA. Defendant: “Even
though I do not believe you will prevail, I recognize your action was filed in good faith and,
therefore, even if my client prevails on your claim, he will not be entitled to attorney fees.
Therefore, in order to reduce his obligation to me for my attorney fees, my client hereby offers
you the amount he believes you will receive even if you win.” Plaintiff: “Ah, but if I prove even
a technical violation, I will be entitled to attorney fees. . . . I believe it is possible that I can get
more by going to trial so I reject your offer.” Clayton v. Bryan, 753 So.2d 632, 635–36 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (Harris, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). But see Riddle & Assoc., P.C. v.
Kelly, 414 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2005) (sanctioning a consumer-advocacy attorney for bringing a
frivolous FDCPA claim).
115. Kenneth E. Rubinstein & Alexander G. Rheaume, Courts, Congress Send Mixed
Messages to Debt Collectors, NEW HAMPSHIRE BUS. REV., July 27, 2007, http://www.all
business.com/legal/banking-law-credit-regulation/5845493-1.html.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Araki, supra note 112, at 17, 28.
120. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115.
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communications.121 While these groups had hoped that courts would fill such
gaps with case law, several court decisions have placed collection agencies in a
precarious position,122 leaving many legitimate companies wondering how to
comply with federal law.123
This issue stems from the “Mini-Miranda”124 which requires:
§ 807: False or Misleading Representations
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation
or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the
general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of
this section:
...
(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the
consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is
oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to
collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose,
and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the
125
communication is from a debt collector.

It was originally believed that “initial communication” did not include any
contact in which the debt collector did not speak directly to the debtor and
instead merely asked the debtor to call the collector back.126 These
communications include emails, voicemails and text messages. However, in
Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Association., the court ruled that “while [voicemail]
messages may not technically mention specific information about a debt or the
nature of the call, Section 1692e(11) applies to the information conveyed
“directly or indirectly.”127 This, of course, includes instances in which the debt
collector has left some form of message for the debtor to call him or her

121. Id. COMMERCIAL LAW LEAGUE OF AM., WHITE PAPER OF THE COMMERCIAL LAW
LEAGUE OF AMERICA 1 (May 2007), http://www.clla.org/clla_resources/position_papers.cfm?
paper=48 [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. Posting of Connie Prater to CreditCards.com Blog, Debt
collector calling . . . and e-mailing . . . and texting?, http://blogs.creditcards.com/2008/02/debtcollector-calling-e-mailing-texting.php (Feb. 27, 2008).
122. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115. Erskine, supra note 108, at 247.
123. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115.
124. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2006). WHITE PAPER, supra
note 121, at 2.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). (emphasis added).
126. According to the FTC Staff Commentary on the FDCPA, “[t]he term [communication]
does not include situations in which the debt collector does not convey information regarding the
debt, such as: [a] request to a third party for a consumer to return a telephone call to the debt
collector, if the debt collector does not refer to the debt or the caller’s status as (or affiliation
with) a debt collector.” WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 3.
127. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115–16 (C.D. Cal. 2005);
see also Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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back.128 Other corroborating authority has suggested that even if the
information does not specifically mention the debt owed it still prompts the
debtor to call back the collections agency which means the definition of an
“indirect communication” has been met.129 Thus, a Mini-Miranda warning
mentioning the debt, is required when leaving a message for a debtor.
It is hard to argue that the requirement of the Mini-Miranda warning is
unfair to collectors. Without such a provision, collectors could find a loophole
to avoid the disclosure requirement as well as other provisions of the FDCPA
that relate only to “communications.”130
However, the classification of a message left for the debtor as a
“communication” under the FDCPA places collection agencies in an uncertain
position. The FDCPA, out of concern for consumer privacy, requires
collectors to refrain from communicating with third parties about a debtor’s
debt.131 For example, the FDCPA has banned the use of postcards to
communicate the presence of debt out of fear that a consumer’s privacy will be
breached.132 While nondisclosure laws do protect consumer privacy, the law
has not yet taken into account the possibility of instances where the collector
does not initially speak to the debtor, but simply leaves a message. Courts
have held that a Mini-Miranda warning left in a message does enough to alert
third-parties about an outstanding debt to warrant civil remedies.133 With new
methods of communication, consumer-advocacy attorneys have several
possibilities to make a case for a violation. If a debt collector leaves a
voicemail message without a Mini-Miranda warning, they risk litigation under
15 U.S.C. §1692a(11). If the collector leaves a message that contains a MiniMiranda warning, they risk claims of illegal disclosure if a third-party
overhears the message or if the message is left on the wrong answering
machine or voicemail pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692c.134 Many collection
agencies, out of fear of paying high civil damages, have stopped leaving
messages altogether.135

128. Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
129. Id. at 5–6.
130. Erskine, supra note 108, at 254.
131. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act , 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2006); Rubinstein &
Rheaume, supra note 115.
132. 15 U.S.C. §1692f(7).
133. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115. For example, a message that sufficed to alert a
third party of an outstanding debt was “Hello, this is Thomas Hunt. Please have an adult contact
me regarding some rather important information. This is not a sales call, however, regulations
prevent me from leaving more details. You will want to contact me at . . . as soon as possible. . . .
Thank you.” WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 4.
134. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 6, 12. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
135. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115.
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However, a complete cessation of leaving messages could have drastic
consequences for the collections industry.136 This will harm the collection rate
of agencies, whose losses will be passed on to consumers who pay their bills
on time.137 Also, consumers could feel harassed138 or uneasy about an
unknown number that appears on their Caller ID but does not leave a message.
This, logically, could lead to more consumers suing and leave collectors few
options if they cannot communicate with consumers.139 Lastly, and perhaps
most importantly, this could preclude the possibility of working out a
settlement,140 because if a collector can never get in touch with a consumer,
they may have to resort to obtaining a judgment in court. Several new and
popular forms of media not only increase the likelihood of these types of suits,
but open up the possibility of other potential violations that should be settled
by Congress instead of needless litigation. In addition, by virtue of the
FDCPA’s status strict liability standard,141 the debt collector runs the risk of
falling into several traps without updated legislation.
B.

Cellular Telephones

One risk debt collectors face is contacting debtors on cell phones. There is
virtually no way of knowing whether the number provided by the debtor is a
cell phone number.142 Even if a debt collector is aware he or she is contacting
a cell phone, millions of Americans have eliminated their landlines in favor of
cell phones. In fact, one in four cell phone users does not have a landline at
all.143 And with the economy in recession, many predict that this growing
trend will continue, as landlines are viewed by many as unnecessary
expenditures.144
Without an update to the FDCPA, debt collectors face the possibility of
fighting frivolous litigation, as the FDCPA’s strict liability standard gives the
honest collector little defense. Because cell phones usually accompany a
136. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 12.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id.
140. Rubinstein & Rheaume, supra note 115.
141. See Clark v. Capital Credit, 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006) (“‘Congress took
care to require an element of knowledge or intent in certain portions of the FDCPA where it
deemed such a requirement necessary’ further supports our conclusion that § 1692k(c) generally
makes the FDCPA a strict liability statute.”). See also Turner v. J.D.V.B., 330 F.3d 991, 995 (7th
Cir. 2003).
142. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 15.
143. David Ho, Mobile Phone Is Primary Phone for Many, THE ATLANTA JOURNALCONSTITUTION, Oct. 3, 2008, at 5G.
144. Daniel Gross, Phones Without Homes: What’s Really Killing the Land-line Phone
Business, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/149256; see Ho, supra note
143.
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person during the day, there is a risk that a collector could inadvertently
contact a consumer at an “unusual time or place”145 or “at a place of
employment.”146 In addition, the law is unclear whether a collector could face
liability if he or she contacts a debtor in another time zone in which it is after 8
p.m. or before 7 a.m.147 While these technicalities might seem trivial, they are
likely sufficient for a consumer-advocacy attorney to drag an honest collector
through needless litigation or extract a settlement with a substantial amount of
attorneys’ fees.
C

Electronic Mail

Several issues concerning email confront collection agencies. Some
collectors feel that communicating with debtors by email might be the best for
both parties because it allows them a quick and easy way to communicate
while empowering debtors with the choice of where and when to read the
email or call the collector.148 In fact, one study revealed that by a margin of
four to one, debtors prefer to resolve their overdue accounts over email as
opposed to answering a call from a collector.149 The study further suggested
that initial communication through email makes debtors more likely to agree to
a settlement.150
As the law exists today, when a debtor is sent a letter via the U.S. Postal
Service, it is assumed that the letter will be read only by the debtor; any thirdparty knowledge of the debt is not the fault of the collector.151 However, it
remains to be seen whether this same standard applies to email. What if an
email is sent incorrectly, perhaps by errantly choosing “Reply to All?” In one
case, a collector in England listed the names of 600 other debtors in a
collections email.152 As a spokeswoman from a consumer group said, “The
145. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (2006).
146. If the debt collector knows that the debtor’s employer does not allow such calls, the
collector may also incur liability. Id. § 1692c(a)(3). Posting by Chandra to Texas Lawyer Blog,
http://www.uslaw.com/library/Texas/Fair_Debt_Collection_Practices_Act_Complaints_Rise.php
?item=100025 (April 1, 2008) (calls to work is the fourth-most-common complaint to the FTC
regarding FDCPA violations).
147. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 15; Prater, supra note 121.
148. Lisa Rogak, Debt Collection Goes Virtual, CREDITCARD.COM, Oct. 16, 2008,
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/virtual-debt-collection-agents-1273.php.
149. Id. The report cited the fact that some consumers prefer the anonymity and privacy of
handling collections over the Internet as opposed to over the telephone. Id. In addition, using
email to collect a debt can be less confrontational. Using email can be a win-win situation
because the debtor becomes empowered as to when and where he handles the issue, as opposed to
a phone call. Prater, supra note 121.
150. Rogak, supra note 148.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c); see WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 20.
152. Bailiff Admits to Privacy Blunder, BBC NEWS, Dec. 10, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/7775353.stm.
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stories of careless handling of personal data are now a regular occurrence.
This irresponsible disclosure of personal information is just another
example.153
Another fear is the possibility that an employer, who possibly has the legal
right to view employee’s email,154 might view a debt collection email. With
many Americans mixing their work and personal email,155 consumers might be
concerned that employers could discover their outstanding debt, which could
lead to possible termination or other issues at work. In addition, when a debtor
receives an email, even if it is after work hours, there is always risk that the
email could be received while the debtor is working late, creating a possible
violation of the FDCPA by contacting the debtor during an “unusual time or
place.”156
D. SMS Text Messaging
In the last decade, Americans have grown increasingly accustomed to
communicating via text message.157 In 2003, 14 billion domestic texts were
sent within the United States.158 By the end of 2004, that number had reached
25 billion.159 In just three years, that number has increased exponentially, as
28.8 million texts were sent in the month of June 2007 alone.160
With so many consumers accustomed to communicating through text
messaging, collection agencies are finding text messaging to be a very

153. Id.
154. O’Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding warrantless searches of a government
employee’s desk and file cabinets is permissible under the 4th Amendment if it is reasonable in
scope and if it is justified at its inception by a non-investigatory, work-related need or a
reasonable suspicion of work-related misconduct). Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp.,
823 F.2d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that although employees have reasonable
expectation of privacy in a private sector office, an employer reserves the right to search through
“areas given over to his exclusive use” as long as the employee was previously notified.)
155. WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 19.
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (“[A] debt collector may not communicate with a consumer
in connection with the collection of any debt . . . at any unusual time or place or a time or place
known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.”).
157. See Eric J. Sinrod, Exploding Growth in Mobile Messaging, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 12,
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/ericjsinrod/2005-01-12-sinrod_x.htm.
Text
messaging is a way to communicate from one mobile phone to another using Short Messaging
Service (SMS). The typical text message allows 160 characters to be sent. Marguerite Reardon,
U.S. Text Usage Hits Record Despite Price Increases, CNET NEWS, Sept. 10, 2008,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-10038634-94.html (quoting Sen. Herb Kohl).
158. Sinrod, supra note 157.
159. Id.
160. Reardon, supra note 157.
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effective method of informing consumers they owe money.161 Similar to email
it gives the debtor more control and ownership over the process by allowing
the debtor to call the collection agent back on his or her own time.162 One
agency in Johannesburg, South Africa, reports that since it started using text
messaging to communicate with debtors, its collections have improved 20% in
three months.163 Another collection agency in London claims that texting
produces a higher response rate than traditional methods of contact, increasing
collection rates as much as 38% in some months.164
Similar to email, text messaging presents legal risks similar to those posed
by email communications. Because most Americans carry their cell phones
with them during the day, there is a risk that a collector could technically
contact a debtor while they are at work, at any time of the day. In addition,
text messages occasionally deliver hours later than they are sent, creating a risk
that debtors could receive collection texts out of the permissible hours under
the FDCPA.165 Lastly, because text messaging to collect debt has yet to
become popular in United States, the issue of whether a Mini-Miranda warning
can fit into a text lingers.
Essentially, as many other forms of communication are seen as
advantageous for both the consumer and the debtor, the FDCPA must be
clarified in order to make these alternative forms of communication
mainstream.166
E.

Validation Notice

Another source of litigation under the FDCPA is the requirement of a
“Validation Notice.” The FDCPA requires that the initial communication to a
debtor must contain a notice to the consumer that he or she is allowed to
dispute the listed debt.167 If the consumer chooses to dispute the debt, he or
she must do so in writing, and upon receiving such notice, the collection agent
must cease collection efforts until he or she is able to verify the debt.168
However, much litigation has followed regarding the issue of whether the
language accompanying the validation notice may express urgency and

161. Louise Bolotin, Now It’s Debt Collection—by Text, THE OBSERVER (London), June 3,
2007, at 16, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/jun/03/creditanddebt.observer
cashsection.
162. Rogak, supra note 148.
163. Iain Scott, SMS Messaging ‘Improves Debt Collection’, ITWEB (South Africa), July 22,
2003, http://ww2.itweb.co.za/sections/business/2003/0307221107.asp?S=Business%20Applicatio
ns&A=BAP&O=FRGN.
164. See Bolotin, supra note 161, at 16.
165. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (2006).
166. Prater, supra note 121.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
168. Id. § 1692g(b).
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excitement about the time within which the debt may be paid.169 Many courts
have noted that this has confused the consumer and eliminated the purpose of
the validation notice altogether.170 A consumer who has legitimate doubts
about whether he or she actually owe a listed debt might be too afraid to
contest it if the same collection letter warns that if they don’t pay in ten days,
their credit will be adversely affected. As one scholar put it, “One can hardly
quarrel with the congressional intent to make the consumer fully aware of the
salient aspects of the transaction, but the agony suffered by collectors and
debtors alike in dealing with the validation section raises questions about the
utility of the notice in its present form.”171
While many collection agencies use forceful and harsh language in their
initial communication, believing that such language is the only way a
consumer will pay, it remains to be seen whether settlement tactics, at least
initially, would be a more effective way to collect debt. At least one court felt
comfortable requiring that the debt collector use non-demanding or threatening
language alongside its validation notice.172 In addition, while a plainly visible
and clearly worded validation notice can inform consumers that they have the
right to challenge their debt, it is still questionable whether the average
consumer knows what to do next. As result of this minimal requirement, much
consumer ignorance still exists about how to properly contest a debt. This
issue particularly plagues older consumers, who are often confused about
whether the debt actually exists, to what extent they are actually indebted, and
what steps the collection agency is allowed to take.173
VI. AMEND THE FDCPA TO FULFILL ITS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
As stated above, when Congress passed the FDCPA, its goal was not only
to end harassment by unfair debt collectors, but also to protect the collections
industry from unscrupulous and harassing collectors. Even though Congress
understood the importance of the collections industry to the economy in 1978,
it is unlikely that it imagined how important the industry would become.
While the collections industry needs a fair chance to collect legally owed
debts, they continue their efforts with the assumption that the majority of
debtors with excessively delinquent accounts are “deadbeats” who never intend
to pay. As empirical evidence suggests, this is far from the truth: the vast
majority of consumers feel a responsibility to pay debts that they legally owe,

169. See id. § 1692g(a).
170. Id. at 846.
171. Id. at 845.
172. See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991).
173. Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection
After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 736 (2006).
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especially to the original creditor.174 This well-supported theory directly
negates the current consumer credit industry’s strategy, which justifies
unnecessarily harsh and borderline illegal tactics to collect debts with the
thought that these debtors are “deadbeats” who never intend to pay.175
While the notion of the deadbeat debtor has largely been debunked,
consumer-advocacy attorneys continue to spoil the relationship between
consumers and creditors, causing consumers to give in to their worst
temptations of not paying debt they know they legally owe. By filing these
frivolous lawsuits against collection agencies, sometimes for statutory fees and
attorneys’ fees that far exceed the debt owed, collection agencies are being
forced to eliminate legally owed debt entirely.176 However, many collection
agencies are not innocent, as too many agencies take advantage of those who
do not have the resources to protect themselves, threatening impossible
remedies such as jail time.177
At least one scholar has suggested that the FDCPA should be amended to
eliminate the remedy of attorneys’ fees for the debtor, or at least make the
standard much higher.178 However, this solution would highly discourage
those who do have legitimate claims against unscrupulous debt collector.
However, this could cause consumers with particularly little debt, even if not
legally owed, in a position to just pay the collector as their best option. What
this suggestion does not take into account is that debtors who legally owe debts
genuinely want to pay the money they legally owe. However, the combination
of unscrupulous debt collectors as well as greedy consumer-advocacy attorneys
interferes with this process.
Based upon these premises, there are several ways to protect collection
agencies from frivolous lawsuits while allowing consumers the proper causes
of action they need make legitimate claims against dishonest debt collectors.
A.

Validation Notice and Settlement Offer

The FDCPA should be amended to require that the first communication
sent to any debtor contain no demand for immediate payment. This eliminates
the possibility of litigation regarding the language accompanying the demand
for payment, limiting the number of technical violations available to consumeradvocacy attorneys. It also allows consumers legitimate concerns regarding
the validity of a listed debt to contest their liability without fearing that lack of
immediate payment will lead to a bad credit rating or worse. This
communication should merely state that a debt is owed, list the amount owed,
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra Part IV.
Goldberg, supra note 173, at 736.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part IV.
Araki, supra note 112, at 108.
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explain the procedure for contesting a debt as well as listing the original
creditor.179
In addition, the 1-877-FTC-Help hotline number must be included in the
letter, with a notice that if a debtor is confused about the debt or wants to file a
complaint, he or she may call the number toll-free.180 This will allow
uneducated consumers as well as minority and elderly debtors to inquire about
the process of contesting a debt.
In addition, debt collectors should be required to initially offer a
reasonable settlement in an amount lower than the full amount of money owed
if the debtor falls into a particular income category. While the credit industry
will likely argue that a deadbeat is a deadbeat and that attempts to negotiate or
settle will do nothing, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Instead of a
collector attempting to seek blood from a turnip, as studies reveal that a vast
majority of delinquent debtors are in fact those who aren’t able to fully pay,
collectors will likely have the advantage of wasting less money on collections
while getting a portion of what they are owed if they initially offer a
reasonable settlement.181 In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that if a bill
is set at a level that a debtor could reasonably expect to be able to pay, debtors
are more likely to pay it.182 In addition, all prior agreements that the original
creditor had, including reduced payment plans, must be honored. Giving the
debtor the opportunity to be involved in the process, instead of merely being
told exactly what they owe, will have the effect of making the consumer pay
quicker, taking away from the traditional view of the collector as a distant,
unscrupulous entity. An informed consumer who has the ability to settle with
a collection agency will be less likely to resort to the dishonest methods
suggested by several consumer-advocacy attorneys.
Although the collections industry might argue that a mandatory settlement
offer requirement for qualified debtors would substantially hurt its profit
margin, it need not look further than the Internal Revenue Service’s long

179. This is the Mini-Miranda warning.
180. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DEBT COLLECTION FAQS: A GUIDE FOR CONSUMERS (Feb.
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre18.shtm. This hotline, set up by the
Federal Trade Commission, is for debtors to file complaints or ask questions. While some may
argue that this would increase litigation by informing a consumer of his or her right to take action,
this author believes that the presence of this number on every validation notice would make debt
collectors much more cautious and ethical in their collection efforts.
181. Murphy, supra note 85 (evincing the theory that, especially in economic downturn,
collectors are having a particularly difficult time collecting debts because people simply do not
have the money to pay, resulting in much lower profit margins for debt collectors. Some
collection agencies are even losing money. As stated by one CEO of Kaulklin Ginsberg, a
consulting firm for the collection industry, “[y]ou can’t get blood from a stone.”).
182. See James Unland, Letters to the Editor: Unfair Attack on Hospitals, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2006, at 32.
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awaited Offer in Compromise Program.183 After years of the IRS struggling to
collect back taxes from delinquent debtors, including using expansive
collection tactics and obtaining expensive judgments, the IRS came to the
conclusion that their efforts to collect from impoverished debtors were not cost
effective.184 Instead, the IRS began the Offer in Compromise Program, which
allows qualified debtors to negotiate with the Service based upon ability to
pay.185 These settlements vary from lump sum payments to installment
agreements.186 The stated goal of the program is to “achieve collection of what
is potentially collectable at the earliest possible time and at the least cost to the
Government.187 However, in order to qualify for an Offer in Compromise, the
delinquent debtor is required to provide documentation, requiring the debtor to
become active in the process.188
One category of qualified debtors is “Doubt as to Collectability,” which is
used when the IRS doubts that the debtor can actually pay the full debt before
the statute of limitations has run.189 This category would likely be the most
acceptable to the collections industry, as it appears to be the most cost effective
as determined by the IRS. In order to be eligible for this exception, a debtor
would have to submit documentation proving the presence of a dire financial
situation. Another category is “Effective Tax Administration,” which says that
although the debtor might be able to pay, making him pay would be “unfair”
given his financial situation.190 This would likely place too much strain on the
collections industry, and thus should not be sufficient to mandate required
settlement offers.
Similar proposals requiring debt collectors to offer reasonable payment and
settlements to qualified debtors have been popular in the area of medical debt.
For example, one proposal in the Illinois General Assembly suggested that in
order for a hospital to receive or retain tax-exempt status, they must offer
reasonable payment plans for less than cost to debtors who could not afford

183. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7122–7122f.
184. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS POLICY STATEMENT P-5-100 (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=111920,00.html [hereinafter IRS POLICY
STATEMENT].
185. 26 U.S.C. § 7122; Pamela Yip, A Kinder Uncle Sam: The IRS Backs Off Harsh Measures
Against Taxpayers in Hardship, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 8, 2009, at 1D (stating that
in this current financial crisis, the IRS has “taken steps to give [taxpayers] a break”; in addition, if
taxpayers don’t qualify for the offer in compromise, the IRS now offers increased flexibility).
186. 26 U.S.C. § 7122c(1)(A)–(B).
187. IRS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 184.
188. Id.
189. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b)(2) (2010). IRS Tax Relief, IRS Offer in Compromise (2005),
http://www.taxoic.com/oic.php.
190. Id.
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pay their bills.191 Further, the proposed law set limits on the extent to which
hospitals could sell their debts after they become delinquent.192
B.

Amend FDCPA to Take Into Account Recent Communications Technology

In order to avoid inundating our nation’s court dockets with claims
alleging technical violations of the FDCPA, Congress should amend the
FDCPA to specifically account for changes in communications technology.
The FDCPA should be amended to overrule the decision in Hosseinzadeh and
expressly state that messages left for consumers, whether by email, text
message, or voicemail, are not “communications” under the FDCPA and thus
do not require a Mini-Miranda warning. In order to be excluded from this
definition, the message should only indicate the name of the caller, that the call
concerns an adult matter and that the debtor should contact the person leaving
the message as soon as possible. This innocuous request should not be
considered a communication, as it does very little to directly or indirectly
communicate the presence of a debt. As the FTC Commentary states,
messages left for a debtor were never intended to be considered a
“communication” within the definition of the statute.193
If a collector leaves a message similar to the one stated above, the FDCPA
should be amended to explicitly state that this message is not sufficient to raise
privacy concerns contemplated by 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). This should apply to
emails and other methods of communication as well. This bright-line rule will
save collectors from a lose-lose situation by allowing collectors to reach
debtors by leaving a message without risking suit for breach of privacy.
Allowing collectors the opportunity to leave messages for debtors is
instrumental in creating a meaningful dialogue between the two parties. This
will also solve the problem regarding communicating by text-messaging, as
there will no longer be the requirement of a Mini-Miranda warning in text
messages because they will not be considered “communications.”
Concerning the issue of a collector reaching a debtor at an inappropriate
time or place due to the use of cell phone, email or text message, the FDCPA
should be amended to eliminate the strict liability nature of these violations.
The use of email and text messaging is evolving into an effective and
preferable way to collect debt for both the consumer and the collector. Unlike
the telephone, which requires the debtor to speak to the collector at the time of
the call, emails and text messages allow the debtor the opportunity to the call
the debtor back on his or her own time, allowing the debtor to not let collection
efforts affect his or her work.194 A strict liability standard makes these means
191.
192.
193.
194.

210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 88/30(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2009).
Id. at § 88/30(b).
WHITE PAPER, supra note 121, at 3.
See supra Part V.B–D.
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of communication too risky for collectors, hurting the consumer and collector
alike. In addition, the rising use of cell phones at the expense of landlines also
puts the collector at risk of litigation because, in many cases, this is the only
way to contact the debtor at all. As these mediums provide too many
opportunities for claimants to allege technical violations of the FDCPA with a
strict liability standard, the Act should be amended to require a claimant who
alleges that collector has contacted him or her at an inconvenient time or place
or at a place of employment195 to prove that a collector acted at least
negligently.196 Thus, if a debtor informs a collection agency that they prefer
not to be called at work, would rather not be text messaged, or do not want to
handle their debt over email, any subsequent actions taken by the collector
using these mediums could be considered violations. These changes should do
much to eliminate many of the hyper-technical violations congesting our
courts, while letting truly aggrieved consumers collect damages against truly
negligent collectors.
In addition, the FDCPA should give the same presumption of privacy to
email that it gives to collection efforts sent by U.S. Mail. However, this
creates an issue of whether an employer may be able to discriminate against or
fire an employee he or she knows to have a large amount of outstanding debts.
Thus, Congress should amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act197 to
account for this problem. This Act, which protects employees from being fired
due to wage garnishments, should logically be extended to prevent employers
from discriminating against employees who have accumulated large amounts
of debt.
C. Amend the FDCPA to Hold Original Creditors Liable for Negligent
Hiring
While I have laid out the reasons why Congress should amend the FDCPA
to limit frivolous litigation, adequate safeguards are still necessary to protect
consumers from unscrupulous collectors. As stated before, the FDCPA does
not consider in-house debt collectors to be “debt collectors” under the meaning
of the statute.198 Congress listed several reasons for this decision, including:
195. See Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2006).
196. Although the standard would be raised from strict liability to negligence, the plaintiff
would not be required to prove duty, breach, causation, and damages in the normal sense of
common law negligence. It would only require that the plaintiff prove that the defendant
collector failed to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do under like
circumstances. For example, if a collector contacted a debtor at work after the debtor requested
the collector not to, this would be negligent behavior.
197. Consumer Protection Credit Act, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
198. See Kizer v. Fin. Am. Credit Corp., 454 F. Supp. 937, 939 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (holding
that “it clearly appears that the ‘debt collectors’ covered by DCPA are those who regularly collect
debts for others and not creditors of consumers . . . .” Thus, when the defendant did not attempt
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“1) one-third of the states’ debt collection laws regulate creditors; (2) because
debt collectors usually work on accounts that are at least six months overdue,
these accounts are usually difficult to collect and are more likely to result in
the use of harsh collection tactics; 3) independent debt collectors are the
primary source of egregious collection practices; (4) in-house collectors
generally restrain themselves from engaging in abusive debt collection
practices because of their desire to protect and maintain the goodwill of their
customers; (5) creditors are usually larger and more stable than third-party debt
collectors; and (6) existing Federal Trade Commission remedies and
199
enforcement are sufficient to regulate in-house collection practices.”

While is it safe to assume that in-house collectors are tempered in their
efforts to collect debt in fear of alienating customers, the same cannot said for
the next step in the collections process: assigning or selling the debt to a thirdparty collection agent. Assigning this debt allows the creditor the freedom to
purportedly get higher returns on delinquent account receivables while turning
a blind eye to dirty collection practices.200 This allows the creditor anonymity
and avoids customers’ ill will. The FDCPA has made a half-hearted response
to this problem by making it illegal for original creditors to use pseudonyms
when attempting to collect a debt in order to give the appearance to the
consumer that a third-party collector has intervened.201
While some leaders in the healthcare industry advise their members to
perform a reasonable investigation to assure that the collectors they outsource
to are ethical,202 it remains to be seen whether this protocol is widely practiced.
Additionally, it can also be argued that when creditors do assign their debts, it
is not difficult to ascertain whether the collector is ethical or not.203
With this in mind, Congress should amend the FDCPA to create a federal
cause of action allowing for direct liability against creditors who negligently

to collect debts owed to another it was held not to be a “debt collector.); Perry v. Stewart Title
Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The legislative history of section 1692a(6) indicates
conclusively that a debt collector does not include the consumer’s creditors . . . .”).
199. Araki, supra note 112, at 81−82.
200. One scholar suggests that by allowing a creditor to assign its debts to immune collectors,
this could increase the likelihood of unethical debt collection. See Derek S. Burrell, The Federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: An Overview RX for Debt Collection Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 1 (1996).
201. Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6) (2006). See also Castro v. Revere
Collection Agency, No. 90-5684, 1991 WL 147529, at *2 n.3−4 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1991)
(rejecting the theory that the collection agency was an agent of the original creditorbecause the
pseudonym exception “strengthens the argument that creditors generally are not covered by the
Act; if they were, such an exception extending liability to a narrow group of creditors would not
be necessary.” Thus, “the language of a federal statute need not explicitly address the concept of
agency in order to displace common law agency rules.”).
202. See generally HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 4.
203. See Colo. Capital v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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hire collection firms that are abusive and harassing to consumers. For good
reason, many courts have thrown out the possibility of holding original
creditors vicariously liable for the torts of their collectors largely due to the
lack of an agency relationship.204 It would be unfair to hold a creditor strictly
liable for the torts of a collection agency205 when they do not have any control
over the methods the agency uses.206 Instead, holding a creditor liable as the
employer of an independent contractor and thus requiring a creditor to use due
diligence in choosing collectors is a more appropriate standard.207
Claims for negligent hiring of collection agencies have experienced at least
some success.208 In Colorado Capital v. Owens,209 the U.S. District Court of
New York denied defendant Providian’s motion to dismiss a claim that, as an
204. See id. at 188; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000)
(“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (the ‘principal’) manifests
consent to another person (the ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent consents so to act.”).
205. However, at least some cases have addressed the possibility of assigning liability to the
creditor for the actions of its debt collectors. E.g., Sonmore v. Checkrite Recovery Servs., Inc.,
No. 99CIV2039DDAFLN, 2000 WL 34494811 at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2000) (holding that a
creditor can be held vicariously liable for the conduct of an attorney whom it hires to collect a
debt).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965) (“It is negligence to permit a third
person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor
knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself
in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”).
207. See Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958)
(“An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but
who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his
physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking.”). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
307 (1965) ( “It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether a human being or a thing, which
the actor knows or should know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or defective, that its use
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 307
cmt. b (1965) (“On the other hand, there are certain relations, of which that of master and servant
is an instance, in which the actor may be required to take reasonable care to ascertain by
inspection the actual character of a thing turned over to him by even a careful person or bought of
a reputable manufacturer.”).
208. See Freeman v. CAC Fin., Inc., No. 3:04 CV 981 WS, 2006 WL 925609, at *3 (S.D.
Miss. Mar. 31, 2006) (holding that if the employer of an independent contractor “knows or should
have known of an employee’s propensity for misbehavior, then the employer may be held liable
for negligent hiring.” Thus, if the plaintiffs can show that the original creditor knew how the
collection agent was conducting itself, there may be a finding of liability.) (citing Jones v. Toy,
476 So.2d 30, 31 (Miss. 1985)).
209. See Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 190; Castro v. Revere Collection Agency, No. 90-5684
1991, WL 147529, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1991) (“The text of the [FDCPA], legislative history,
and case law lead inescapably to the conclusion that, with a limited exception not present in this
case, the [FDCPA] is applicable only to debt collectors, not the creditors who hire them. Because
Congress has made it clear that creditors are not generally covered by the Act, common law
agency principles are inapplicable and may not be applied to impose liability on a creditor.”).
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original creditor, it was negligent when it hired an abusive third-party
collection agency.
In this case, the plaintiff was subject to unfair and abusive collection
practices in his attempt to contest a debt.210 The debt was originally owed to
Providian, a bank that extends lines of credit through credit cards.211 The
plaintiff alleged common law negligence, asserting that defendant had a duty
of care under New York common law to exercise care in selecting, instructing
and supervising debt collection firms it hired.212 The defendant argued that
creditors do not owe a duty of care because there is no agency relationship
between a creditor and a debt collector. However, the plaintiff argued in the
alternative that the defendant hired the collection agency as an independent
contractor and was thus subject to direct liability.213
On the issue of agency, the court agreed with defendant, holding that the
defendant’s lack of control over the debt collector eliminated the possibility of
an agency relationship.214 However, on the issue of whether the defendant and
the debt collector shared a relationship of employer-independent contractor,
respectively, at least for a motion to dismiss, the court agreed with the
plaintiff.215 The court stated that although pertinent state common law holds
that employers cannot be held directly liable for torts associated with their
independent contractor, there is an exception for the negligence of the
employer in selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor.216 This
exception is a form of direct liability because it concerns the employer’s
liability for its own actions or omissions rather than vicarious liability for the
acts or omissions of its contractor.217 Thus, if the plaintiff can prove the
elements of negligence, he or she can succeed on this claim.218

210. Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 187.
211. Id. at 187–88. Providian Financial Corporation is a leading provider of credit cards to
mainstream American consumers” and was recently purchased by Washington Mutual.
Providian Financial Shareholders Approve Merger with Washington Mutual, BUS. WIRE, Aug.
31, 2005, at 1, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2005_August_31/ai_n
14939765.
212. Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 188.
213. Id.
214. But see Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 86 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that because the original creditor maintained sufficient control over the debt
collector, the original creditor could be held vicariously liable for the torts of its agent. Such
control included requiring the collector to activate accounts received within 48 hours, send three
letters within the first 60 days, and conduct a supervisory review for delinquent accounts.).
215. Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 188; see also A.W. Howe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc,
686 F. Supp. 461, 466–67 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
216. Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 188.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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After confirming the presence of an employer-independent contractor
relationship, the court considered whether the defendant owed a duty of care to
the plaintiff and whether Providian was truly the proximate cause of the
damages suffered by the plaintiff.219 The court held that because creditors owe
a duty of reasonable care to their customers,220 the defendant did indeed owe a
duty to its customers.221 Specifically, the court felt comfortable with the
notion that creditors should be able to reasonably foresee that a debt collection
firm they hire could possibly resort to impermissible or objectionable conduct
to collect its debt.222 As argued in the plaintiff’s memorandum to the court, a
creditor like Providian has substantial experience as a consumer lender as well
as employing debt collection firms to collect delinquent accounts.223 Because
Providian was likely familiar with the business models of collection agencies,
it either knew or should have known that there was a substantial risk that
agencies were likely to be forced by financial pressures to violate the law.224
Essentially, given most creditors’ experience and knowledge of the debt
collection industry’s troubled history, hiring agencies which are known to use
unethical means to collect money can be seen as prima facie negligent.225
Thus, when a debtor makes such accusations against a creditor, the court must
take certain factors into account when choosing a collector. These factors
include how long the creditor has been in the business of assigning debts, what
the reputation of the collector is, and the business model employed by the
collector.226
As to the issue of whether a court could reasonably hold that a creditor
proximately caused the damage, the court believed that an intervening act by a
third-party does not necessarily break the causal connection between a
defendant’s negligence and a plaintiff’s injury.227 Instead, the plaintiffs need

219. Id. at 189–90.
220. Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
221. Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 189 (finding the imposition of duty (of the collector to the
debtor) as good public policy, as it is entirely reasonable to expect credit card issuers to exercise
due care in the selection of debt collection firms they hire to collect their debts. “[C]redit card
issuers should not be able to escape liability if they hired a debt collection firm that used . . .
torturous means to collect debt from their customers. . . . Thus, the imposition of a duty of care in
this context furthers the legislative and societal judgment that unfair and harmful debt collection
practices in this country are unacceptable.”).
222. Id.
223. Owens Reply Affidavit to Rule 56.1 Statement of Providian Financial Corp. at 4−5,
Colo. Capital v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
224. Id. at 5–6.
225. Id. at 6.
226. Thus, the law should require that creditors make a reasonable investigation into a
collector’s history before they assign debts.
227. Colo. Capital, 227 F.R.D. at 189−90 (citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414
N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980)).
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only prove that the damages caused by the collection agency were reasonably
foreseeable by the original creditor.228
VII. CONCLUSION
While the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has succeeded in several
ways, a closer look at the legislation suggests that several changes need to be
made in order to realize the Act’s congressional intent. With the United States
in a recession, now more than ever Congress must amend the FDCPA to
eliminate frivolous lawsuits alleging technical violations of the Act. These
lawsuits make it more difficult for lenders to extend lines of credit, make the
job of debt collection harder than it has to be, and cause debtors to give in to
their worst temptations of not paying debts they legally owe. These lawsuits
strain the relationship between the debtor and collector, making settlement of
debt a near impossibility. In order to preemptively stop these problems,
Congress must create a federal cause of action allowing debtors to hold
creditors liable for negligently hiring abusive collection agencies. The FDCPA
also must be updated to account for changes in technology and must require
collectors to initially offer settlements to those debtors who are truthfully
unable to pay their full debt. Only then can the true intent of Congress, to
protect consumers from unfair collection practices without imposing
unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors,229 be fully realized.
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